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A Special Historical Study

USAFSS PERFORMANCE  
DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS

Volume I

OPERATIONS

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APRIL - DECEMBER 1962

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A Special Historical Study

USAFSS PERFORMANCE DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS

Volume I

OPERATIONS

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Prepared By:

MSGT THOMAS N. THOMPSON

Under the Supervision of:

BOB W. RUSH  
Chief, Historical Division  
Office of Information

United States Air Force Security Service

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## FOREWORD

The ability and capability to respond quickly and effectively to an emergency situation can be planned, developed, and tested. However, the results of these efforts provide little more than a basic understanding of some of the problems that are surely to be encountered in real emergencies. This knowledge is valuable, to be sure, but the most precious knowledge of all--that which is independent of theory, assumption, or hypothesis--comes only from actual experience. It is this type of knowledge that can be put to practical use. It is this type of knowledge that permits, and actually encourages, accurate perception and discernment of the best ends and best means. It is this type of knowledge that was produced as a result of the Cuban Crisis.

Emergencies such as this rarely come in such rapid succession that we may continually replenish our storehouse of knowledge simply as the need arises. Even so, none of the emergencies with which we have been confronted during the past ten years--which have stretched from Korea to Lebanon to the Congo to Viet Nam to Taiwan to Berlin to Thailand to India to a scant 90 miles from our shores--have been so similar that we could depend upon any one as the sole basis for all our emergency reaction planning. The reason and purpose of this study, therefore, is obvious.

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The true value of this study to the Air Force, Department of Defense, and National effort will depend upon the extent that the information contained herein is integrated with similar data provided by other commands, services, and agencies involved. Its value to this command will depend simply upon the extent it is used.

The participation of the USAF Security Service in the Cuban Crisis tested almost every aspect of the command's emergency reaction capability. For example, both airborne and ground-based as well communications security and transmission security operations were involved. In addition, all of the mission support activities, such as materiel, personnel, communications, funding, etc., were faced with crash projects. Further, personnel and equipment thousands of miles away, which were engaged in similar but yet unrelated missions and operations, were pressed into the effort. It is doubtful that any crisis since the Korean Conflict has created more of an impact upon the command as a whole than the Cuban Crisis. For that reason, we have left no stone unturned in our effort to ~~record~~ every fact and aspect of the command's participation in the crisis. Consequently, we may have violated some of the rules of contemporary historiography by providing minute detail in cases where perhaps a summary statement, chronology,

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or paraphrase normally would suffice.

To accomplish our objective, and in the interest of timeliness and utility, the history of USAFSS participation in the Cuban Crisis will be published in two volumes. Volume I is concerned primarily with activities and Volume II with ground-based activities. Data for both volumes was obtained from Hq USAFSS Staff Offices, particularly DCS/Operations and DCS/Personnel. In addition to correspondence files, project files, operational plans, special orders, etc., interviews by the author, MSgt Thomas N. Thompson, with key personnel throughout the headquarters were the main sources of information. We will not attempt to list the names of all those who helped make this study possible. However, it must be said that the cooperation and support given the Historical Division in the preparation of this history was truly outstanding. To all of those who demonstrated their interest in the successful completion of these volumes, we extend our sincerest appreciation.

No attempt has been made to provide a thorough historical analysis or evaluation of the command's performance during the Cuban Crisis because there are results and developments which may not have their full impact and significance until several months later. However, a cursory analysis reveals several important conclusions that can be drawn even at this early date. First of all, it is obvious that the past success and value of the

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USAFSS program to the National Effort was recognized immediately at the highest levels. In addition, those who recognized the potential of the were completely accurate in their prognosis. In fact, the contribution to the effort in some cases far exceeded expectations. As a result, there are indications at this time that a new type of emergency reaction capability has been born which demands permanent status. Or, as an alternative, there are indications that the USAFSS should be expanded and simultaneously provided with the flexibility necessary to permit rapid deployment to any part of the world to cope with all such emergencies.

Because of the growing importance of developing and maintaining a counter-insurgency and emergency reaction capability, and because of the lessons that can be learned from actual experience, the USAFSS Historical Division has programmed the publication of two more special studies in this series. The first will deal with USAFSS activities in Southeast Asia, and the second will be a summary of USAFSS performance during all emergencies from Korea to Cuba.

Comments, criticisms, and suggestions on this study or those that are programmed for publication during the first half of 1963 are welcomed and should be addressed to the Historical Division, Hq USAFSS (COI-3), San Antonio, Texas.

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THE CRISIS IN CUBA

Introduction

(TS ) The national emergency that was created by the Cuban crisis in October 1962, when it was publicly disclosed that the Soviet Union had installed and was manning short and intermediate range missiles just 90 miles from U.S. shores, shook the American public to an extent not experienced since the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese in December 1941. Certainly the announcement of the situation and the outline of U.S. plans by President Kennedy were dramatic and forceful, especially when backed by photographic evidence of Soviet activities on the island.

(TS ) Not revealed to the U.S. public was the vast effort toward the that had preceded the announcement; but this was certainly a concerted -- and very significant -- effort by all U.S. service cryptologic agencies. Washington officials were aware of the effort and results, but few of them realized the trials and tribulations of military agencies, particularly the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) which was charged with the

Behind the establishment and building of two and processing sites in Florida went tremendous effort on the part of units around the world. All of the results still were not in on

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1 December 1962 -- particularly the effects of the crash program on world-wide operations.

(TS      -) Cuba was of intense and immediate concern to America, but the perennial trouble-spots around the world still were very much in evidence and just as important as in years past. The Berlin Corridor operations fell into this category and still had to be considered a powder-keg at the end of 1962. Of particular significance to USAFSS in this respect was the terrific world-wide drain on aircraft used in the

program by the Florida operations from June 1962 until mid-December 1962. \* Quite simply, during the early months of the operations, the European Security Region (EurSecRgn) was practically stripped of its capability to completely perform its mission because of the withdrawal of a single aircraft -- so thin was its line of equipment. This shortage of equipment was caused by a number of coincidental events -- not all of which were associated with Cuba. The European program was in the middle of expansion of operations to and was expecting, momentarily, further expansion to Several aircraft were being modified and one was in the U.S. for major maintenance. All of this contributed to the critical situation.

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\* For timelines and greater utility, a "cut-off" date of 15 Dec 62 was established for this study.

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An Unforeseen Shortage Adds To The Problem

(TS ) In October 1962, USAFSS ground operations were extended to Key West, Florida, and more comprehensive operations were created at both Key West and MacDill AFB, Tampa, which was the site of flying operations. In the field there were the usual difficulties of setting up a new operational site, but where Cuba was concerned, there was another problem; i.e., personnel to

(S ) This is perhaps difficult to understand with all of the people with backgrounds in the armed services. But USAFSS had never had a great need for such people, and its world-wide operations had always dictated austerity in assignment and manning because of the tremendous expenses involved in training in both the analytical fields. So, primarily important here was not the availability of people who could (these were in great numbers) but people who had all of the categorical qualifications (including background investigations) required for USAFSS operations. And of course there was another consideration. Operations heads knew that these operators also should be proficient in the number of personnel meeting all standards grew even smaller.

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(TS ) These were merely the local problems of establishing and manning the required operations. From a high-level standpoint there may not have been as many, but they certainly were more far-reaching; and at times even frustrating to those at operating levels. From the command level of operations there were undoubtedly many significant points that were unknown -- and problems of diplomatic, international, and perhaps even political significance, that had to be considered. Most of these are still not known, but some day, undoubtedly, will be. These were the things that had to be faced in the \* operations charged to the command. How they were faced will be discussed in detail in the following pages of this study.

### Strategic, Tactical

(TS ) With Cuba almost within commuting distance from Florida and with a constant flow of coming off the island, there certainly was a wealth of vital available to U.S. governmental agencies. But of critical importance to military planners was the

The course of military actions, as well as the outcome, very often were closely related to the production of Here, at the outset at least, the U.S. had an advantage in knowing pretty well the

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it would have to deal with from an                      standpoint -- simply because it had been directly involved with its initial installation.  
The Cuban

Capability Limited To

(TS     )                      were of vital importance during a military engagement when opposing forces were as close together as these two locations.

The command felt that for the first two years of operations Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolutionary Government would have to use equipment provided initially to his guerrilla forces during the revolution.

Neither Castro nor the overthrown dictator Fulgencio Batista had these at his disposal during the uprising, and all

\_\_\_\_\_ had come and would  
\_\_\_\_\_ continue to come from Soviet sources since it was an integral part of the basic equipment. Some of this already had been identified.<sup>2</sup>

(TS     ) USAFSS felt that it would be about two years before

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Soviet equipment and service replaced that of American origin, and it felt that by that time the lack of supplies and shoddy Cuban maintenance should start to take its toll.<sup>3</sup> So the command's initial contribution, played a vital part in the operations, because from the beginning provided the sole source of the range limitations and requirement for precluded full in these ranges.

Gets First Call For Operations Against Cuba

(S ) There had been public rumblings for many months as Soviet activity picked up in Cuba, but little specific action was known to the American people until shortly before the President's dramatic announcement of the "quarantine" in the waters surrounding Cuba. But as far as USAFSS was concerned, the operations started in April 1962, when USAF said there was an urgent requirement for a C-130\*

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\* See illustration next page

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# General Arrangement - SUN VALLEY II



Configuration shown here is same as SUN VALLEY I

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(S ) The Pentagon called for a two-week mission, named project QUICK FOX and wanted the aircraft in place on 1 May to take advantage of

USAF was concerned, however, that it might not be worth bringing an aircraft all the way from Europe for a few days operation, particularly since the Navy was to start a four-week span of on 2 May using WV-2Q Constellations. With this in mind, Air Force officials questioned the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as to the need of the C-130 in addition to the Navy aircraft.<sup>5</sup>

(C ) USAFSS could not supply the aircraft anyway, so Hq USAF ordered the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to fly

The command became involved when said it couldn't provide

went from Kelly AFB to Offutt AFB, Neb., to give SAC the service.<sup>6</sup> As it turned out, there was little gleaned from the material because of mechanical difficulties, but one of the later reported that " . . .

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(TS ) There was no more activity at Hq USAFSS through May, but on 1 June 1962,

told the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the Navy needed help in operations in the Cuban area. Said

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Deployment To Hurt World Operations, USAFSS Knows

(TS ) The insistence on withdrawing a C-130 from Europe was going to hurt, and the assignment of the task -- which was to grow and grow over the months following -- was the beginning of a critical period for the command. There were any number of reasons why the simple deployment of a C-130 from Europe was more complex, costly, and had more wide-reaching consequences, than anyone ~~imagined~~ imagined. These grew more vivid as time passed and USAFSS was faced with problem after problem.<sup>9</sup>

(TS ) Specifically and simply, the command did not want to

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deploy an            from the taught-stretched fleet under the control of the commander of the European Security Region in Germany. First, the            fleet was in the midst of a cyclic modification period, and two C-130's were scheduled to be at the TEMCO Aerosystems\* plant in Greenville, Tex., during most of June, July, and August. Second, though the C-130 was certainly superior to other aircraft models available, the command felt that it was much more advanced a system than was necessary for Cuban operations because it " . . .

systems which we believe would be wasted in the Cuban area." There was also a maintenance problem because the closest C-130 support facility was at Patrick AFB, Fla. The front-end crew would have to come with the aircraft for flight line maintenance.<sup>10</sup>

Command Offers Alternative

(TS ) The command brought out several other considerations in a broad connection with the proposed            effort. This was not a negative attitude toward the task; but serious considerations they certainly were. In the first place, a single C-130 would not do a complete job. The aircraft was programmed for only eight to 10 missions per month, leaving it far short of            Also, the command emphasized that it had no existing requirement for

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\* For a number of USAFSS            configurations, TEMCO had been doing the engineering and installation of the specialized HQ USAFSS TSC 62-6334

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and consequently make-do arrangements would have to be made. It said its " . . . capability was relatively inexperienced and available only through personnel with

" USAFSS had ideas it thought would work, and on 5 June, in a message to USAF, said:<sup>11</sup>

. . . AFSS holds plans for for T-29 type aircraft (ROSE BOWL)" which may be adaptable to other types of aircraft. Configuration includes

This configuration is now used on ROSE BOWL aircraft and can be installed by Air Force personnel using Air Force equipment currently on hand.

. . . It is suggested that a T-29 or similar small aircraft be obtained for this mission. Front end crew would also be more readily available from U.S. sources.

JCS Insists On C-130 From Europe; USAF Assumes Control

(TS ) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were unimpressed with these theories and facts, and told USAF that " . . . there is an urgent special requirement for

. . . Request you deploy one C-130 immediately (to the United States) to commence operations on or about 15 June. . . . "<sup>12</sup>

Then, on 6 June 1962, JCS turned operational responsibility for over to USAF, and that headquarters immediately

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- \* ~~ROSE BOWL~~ was the configuration used very successfully in by the 6929th RSM at Osan, South Korea. USAFSS felt that the size of the operational area, and the

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reminded

. . . At your request, PACAF has been extended to operate out of Alaska from Shemya to Elmendorf. USAF\* is being extended to include operations out of Currently assigned aircraft and manpower are thinly spread to meet these requirements. Request you re-validate the requirement for in light of the foregoing, and establish necessary priorities for If (the) requirement is considered over-riding, request . . . (a) proposed duration of operation, (b) frequency of missions, (and) (c) orbit hours requirements.

USAFSS Calls For More Equipment, Personnel. (TS ) These requirements were not immediately forthcoming, so on 11 June, USAFSS outlined its needs to the Pentagon and what it felt was necessary to completely during the months ahead. This, it knew, called for more than one aircraft. The second equipmental requirement was for

with one in-flight maintenance position. This supported its claim that the C-130 was, at that time at least, too much aircraft for the mission at hand. USAFSS felt that three aircraft would be needed. This called for 72 operators altogether, and three maintenance men for each aircraft. However, the command felt that this would provide sufficient personnel for

leave, TDY, etc. Also there would be need

\* Although the Pacific Security Region and the European Security Region respectively operated the operations in these two overseas theaters, the aircraft were assigned to, and controlled by, the individual theater air commanders.

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for command, administrative, personnel, supply, and communications personnel.<sup>14</sup>

(TS ) For a job that was ostensibly a simple effort, not scheduled at the time for specific long life, this may have looked like quite an ambitious manning schedule but it was a calculated risk that the mission would grow in size and scope. The accuracy of this calculation was borne out over the months following. Unfortunately, the personnel were simply not available within the command -- to say nothing of the aircraft. Said USAFSS:<sup>15</sup>

. . . Officer and airmen manpower spaces are not available within current USAFSS resources to support any new or additional requirements. Manpower spaces to meet additional tasking must be made available by reduced mission or provided by headquarters USAF. . . .

Mission Starts; But Guidelines Missing

(TS ) So, that was the situation as far as resources were concerned. But there was still the assigned mission that had to be completed. Regardless of theories and knowledge of limitations, USAFSS still had to provide an aircraft; so, on 14 June 1962, the 6916th Radio Squadron Mobile (RSM), Rhein Main AB, Germany, was told to send an C-130 and crew to MacDill AFB, Fla., to begin operations immediately. Within a few hours the aircraft cleared Germany and headed for the United States.<sup>16</sup> Five missions were supposed to be flown, and the aircraft was slated to be back

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in Europe by 1 July. This, as events proved, was wishful thinking.

(TS ) The task was levied, but there were still no solid policies or instructions in connection with the operations. In this respect there was one significant factor to consider as far as an efficient operation was concerned.

it had two  
hindering effects on the USAFSS program at MacDill AFB: (a) as mentioned above, the operators had no idea what they were and (b) there was the possibility that the

USAFSS knew that if it were to do a good job, it would have to have some guidance Also,

\*             
            
          

- + That information which was of infinite value to agencies which did commanders and top-level not meet criteria. HQ USAFSS TSC 62-6334  
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(TS ) So, on 15 June, the command told that it needed the time and capability to

Knowing it had to have the capability eventually, the command had already sent

personnel from the Air Force Special Communications Center (AFSCC) Kelly AFB, to Florida to perform limited

There were three portable available at the Florida base. USAFSS recommended, therefore, " . . . approval to report

(TS

Extension of Already In Mill; Europe Aircraft Held

(TS ) At the same time, however, before the first

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five-mission schedule was half finished, the stretch of the effort was already in progress. At the same time the command was told its activities would be unchanged,

EurSecRgn, USAFE Strongly Oppose Move. (TS ) The

European Security Region and USAFE were most affected by the move, however, and both objected strongly to the loss of an aircraft. The EurSecRgn was seriously concerned for its own mission. For various reasons, the European fleet was dwindling rapidly, and amid increased tasking, the region could scarcely afford to lose even a single aircraft. In a return wire to USAFSS the next day EurSecRgn said:<sup>21</sup>

... We view with alarm the loss of this theater for

ACRP coverage, and diversion of an effort will seriously affect our theater This action will result in a minimum loss of 20 percent and will preclude expansion to new areas. Further, our will be seriously impaired. Most important

The requirements for aircraft to Cuban capability. Further, Most important

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of all, our contingency capability and flexibility to react to international situations will be seriously reduced. Feel that the European theater cannot afford a

The type of support required appears to be contrary to normal efforts, and could be accomplished by SAC aircraft, seaborne operations, or other means. Recommend that USAFSS through Air Force, strongly resist all attempts to extend the deployment of beyond 20 June 1962.

(TS ) The alarm extended, understandably, to the commander of USAFE. He also had a considerable stake in the operations and to have his capability cut was acutely detrimental to his own critical effort. USAFE learned of the action at the same time as the EurSecRgn, and the knowledge generated a simultaneous protest to the action. Said USAFE:<sup>22</sup>

. . . Headquarters USAFE strongly opposes the retention of the USAFE C-130 aircraft in the U.S. on an indefinite basis. The loss of an aircraft at this time will reduce USAFE capability as follows: (a)

will reduce the number of aircraft available for operation at any one time to five (two always in maintenance, TEMCO and local PE, plus one in U.S.) whereas stated requirements require 12 mission aircraft, (b) will further reduce the theater capability to fulfill stated requirements in the current areas of the operation by a minimum of ten sorties per month,

At the same time will eliminate the capability of extending operations into new areas, i.e., without unacceptable

(c) will adversely affect USAFE capability to launch against a

(d) will adversely affect USAFE capability to provide USAFSS OPLAN 8-61\* support of SAC and others through coordinated operations. . . .

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\* Procedures whereby

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The USAFE commander added that previous experience showed that with only five aircraft it lost all backup capability; but " . . . more important, USAFE will lose all flexibility required to react to any contingency requiring direct support. . . .".<sup>23</sup>

USAFE Recommends Experimental ULD-1; USAFSS Objects.

(TS ) These vehement protests backed USAFSS's original contention that to hold this aircraft from European operations could have damaging effects. But, in the same message, USAFE brought up a possibility that was to generate continuing discussion over the next four months before a decision was finally made. It recommended, as an alternative to the C-130 already at MacDill AFB, a prototype system that was undergoing test in Europe at the time -- the AN/ULD-1 system<sup>24</sup> (See illustration on page 21).

(TS ) The ULD-1 was an advanced airborne system far more complex than the standard SUN VALLEY configuration generally in use in Europe. The capabilities were potentially much greater than the system in use at the time, but so were the support requirements -- both equipment and personnel. So, there were many drawbacks to using this aircraft, called TALL TOM, though the command admitted that it had to be considered. First of all, the operational tests were not complete and USAFSS wanted all Category III testing finished before it was returned from Europe. It said

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it could not " . . . afford to accept degradation of test at this point in light of considerable investment and need for decision on follow-on aircraft." All of the support problems would be difficult and expensive. <sup>25</sup>

USAFSS Offers U.S. Capability As Answer

(TS ) Meanwhile, USAFE had to be adjusted if the Secretary of Defense requirements were to be fulfilled. But the Cuban mission was the real and immediate consideration and, therefore, needed an answer. USAFSS didn't agree with the practice of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Again, looking into the future, it had to consider that since active enemy operations had come to the Western Hemisphere, plans had to be made to meet similar requirements in days to come. Contingency units were organized in both Europe and the Pacific for immediate, scattered requirements and USAFSS felt that herein lay the answer. But there were no aircraft permanently stationed in the U.S. and it knew it would take time before they could be supplied. \*

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- \* In every development that was a drastic departure from normal operations, USAFSS had to do some planning from a long range standpoint, so these recommendations were not off on a tangent from the Cuban requirements. Almost everything involved in preparing for a completely new requirement, in a new area, such as was involved here, took considerable time. There was time involved in special engineering of equipment and time involved in the training of personnel to operate the equipment. There were also new requirements that had to be prepared for. re-

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Such actions were almost sure to come up again, so the command set about to make preparations for these at the same time the Cuba effort was developing. In a message to USAF on 21 June 1962, it said:<sup>26</sup>

. . . Aircraft could be maintained to deploy anywhere in the Western Hemisphere or to assist temporarily in emergency situations in other areas. When not in operational use, would be used for training purposes. The type of aircraft considered would be a T-29 or larger aircraft, perhaps C-118. . . . These aircraft would necessarily have to be configured for approximately positions with flexibility of utilizing every known airborne adapted equipment.

(TS ) Two T-29's, with positions each, would cost about \$2 million. The command felt the project could be complete 90 days after the approval of design and specifications by using prime labor three shifts per day. C-118's would cost a half million more.<sup>27</sup> These considerations were of prime importance to USAFSS. But at higher headquarters there were apparently many more pressing considerations. Even if the command's recommended solution were approved immediately, it would take from four to six months to have the aircraft in operation.

No Alternative To Use European

(TS ) Although the loss of the aircraft, even for a limited period of time, cut deeply into EurSecRgn's ability to perform its mission, there was a critical underlying reason why the move

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had to be made. Maj. Gen. Richard P. Klocko, USAFSS Commander, could not adamantly insist that it be returned to Europe, regardless of the operational cost. On 21 June 1962, he told Col. Charles E. Taylor, EurSecRgn deputy commander:<sup>28</sup>

. . . The reason for not supporting the immediate return of the C-130 (to Europe)\* (lies in the fact that that the

by (the Department of Defense). Withdrawal of the aircraft or failure to fulfill the requirement would a valid basis for charging that the USAF was unilaterally determining priorities of national requirements. Possible corrective action on high level could seriously inhibit our flexibility in the entire program. You must make the necessary adjustments in the European program to cover the valid requirements with decreased resources on a more austere basis.

(TS ) General Klocko was concerned that if any requirements were turned down, an outside authority might step in to control the program. He told Colonel Taylor that " . . . I realize that this will not be easy but we will try to get relief at the earliest possible time." The relief, General Klocko said, could not be in the form of the TALL TOM aircraft, as it was quite necessary for the Category III testing to be finished before considering its return to the U.S.<sup>29</sup>

EurSecRgn Agrees To Tighten Belt. (TS ) So, the only answer in Europe was a cutback in lower priority missions,

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\* The fact that USAFSS did not support the plea to return the C-130's to Europe did not mean that the commander was not in sympathy with EurSecRgn's dilemma -- it simply meant that he had no choice. It was on record that the aircraft shouldn't be in the U.S. for a prolonged period of time. It also was on record that there should definitely be a Continental U.S. contingency capability. (CDC 22-6-54).

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with the possibility that TALL TOM could be used as long as it didn't interfere in the testing program. The earliest that this aircraft could be ready for regular operations would be 1 September -- quite some time in the future.<sup>30</sup> Knowing it had the problem, EurSecRgn set about to review the entire program. At least some semblance of mission continuity could be maintained, though there was danger that air-to-air support of SAC missions might be degraded to a certain degree by the lack of flexibility. On 25 June, Colonel Taylor told General Klocko that " . . . if they (SAC) fly as they have in the past, feel sure we can support them. But any significant increase would severely tax us." Under any circumstances, he assured the USAFSS commander that " . . . we will carefully consider each requirement for or support, and we will provide the best effort our capability will permit."<sup>31</sup>

Many Procedural, Support Problems To Be Ironed Out

(C ) Meanwhile, at both Hq USAFSS and MacDill AFB, operations officials were working feverishly at straightening out the many details necessary for a smooth operation. First of all, they ~~knew~~ knew that something had to be done to establish mission control at the site and, if possible, limited

but the command knew it was necessary

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for a complete operation. The fact that the mission was being extended indefinitely added to their hopes that such authority would soon come. First, however, the command knew it had to have duplicate

\* because it had to consider:<sup>32</sup>

1. Training of operators and personnel, as the command's capability in was admittedly weak.
2. Development of aids; e.g.,  
etc.
3. Quality control of

(C ) (a) USAFSS  
personnel using AFSSO equipment at MacDill AFB, or (b)

and

transport them to AFSCC. The first alternative would delay about one day. The second would cause the information to be withheld from USAFSS for about a week. The command felt that this was unimportant, particularly if the crews were stable.<sup>33</sup>

(TS ) By the end of the first five operational missions, the command was convinced that chances of a really successful

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\* Since the beginning of operations, the

Thus, the operators had no chance to make duplicates for their use, and the information was never returned to them.

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effort were slim under the existing circumstances. The operators needed if the

was to be used with the most effectiveness. There had been none up to that point, and Maj. Billy J. Harper, AFSSO to the U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM) at MacDill AFB, who had been named project officer for QUICK FOX,\* expressed his concern. The command agreed; and in an attempt to get to the bottom of the difficulties, sent Lt. Col. Robert P. Craig to Florida for a briefing. Afterward, Col. Graig was to go to Washington to try to straighten things out with the top level people. The entire operation was a hodge-podge of inter-command responsibility: USAFSS was responsible for the operation and handling of the back-end

SAC was responsible for aircraft maintenance and the control of flying activities.<sup>34</sup>

QUICK FOX Extended For At Least One Month; Looks Permanent

(TS ) At the end of June, QUICK FOX was extended to at least 1 August, and all of the existing problems became more critical. The crew from the 6916th RSM was extended along with the aircraft, and this created personnel problems that had to be

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\* The AFSSO STRICOM operation was convenient for the operations from the start of project QUICK FOX. Secure communications were available, as well as some secure space. Consequently, as the most expeditious solution, Major Harper was named project officer at the beginning of the operations.

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considered. The AFSCC had sent five \_\_\_\_\_ to augment the \_\_\_\_\_ effort, but only two of these would be there after 1 July. The other three were scheduled for separation from the Air Force. That QUICK FOX would be a permanent effort was becoming more definite all the time, though it had not been specifically named as such up to that point. It was known, however, that Kelly AFB and Key West, Fla., as well as MacDill AFB, were under consideration, so the command made a strong bid to station the aircraft at Goodfellow AFB, Tex., so that when they weren't flying they could be used by the 6940th Technical Training Wing (TTW) for instruction. The command did know that USAF was making serious efforts to get two aircraft assigned to the Western Hemisphere \_\_\_\_\_ problem, but this was a long way in the future. <sup>35</sup>

Many Requirements, But No Authorizations

(S ) Meanwhile, at Hq USAFSS, the old bugaboo of requirements versus authorizations was coming up again and again. Operations officials felt that the AFSCC or the 6940th TTW should be beefed up with qualified \_\_\_\_\_ personnel returning from overseas assignments. These would be \_\_\_\_\_ to assist in the contingency effort since it was not known at the time how long the requirement would remain. Personnel officials, however, said this could not done until the requirement was made

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formal. This still had not been declared by higher headquarters. The task had to include requirements, units of assignment, and any special training required. AFSCC also needed such a document.<sup>36</sup>

Personnel Serious Consideration In Florida. (S ) The most serious impact of all this fell on the project officer at MacDill AFB; who had been officially named executive agent for launch, recovery, and reporting of all missions. He inherited the many responsibilities connected with personnel and logistics, as well as with flying operations. His first problem in continuing the mission was personnel with which to operate. Looking ahead, he knew that at least some of the veterans on the mission would have to be held back to overlap with newcomers. But the effects of the extension order were felt all the way to Europe. The rapid departure of the crew in the first place had made it necessary for them to leave many personal details undone, and this caused a number of difficulties. Several volunteered their services until 1 August, but some had legitimate hardships resulting from the mission.<sup>37</sup>

Commander 6916th RSM Asks Relief. (TS ) The Commander of the 6916th RSM, Rhein Main AB, Germany, was deeply concerned when he heard of the month's extension of his aircraft and personnel. On 28 June, he told the European Security Region:<sup>38</sup>

. . . Due to minimum advance notice and provision in launch message for short period of TDY several operational and personnel problems have arisen. If it is now firm that this

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effort continue at MacDill AFB for an indefinite period, recommend that crews be returned to Rhein Main as soon as possible and redeployed properly equipped and prepared for an indefinite-tour. We have no but do have some operator personnel with a knowledge of the

Some of these personnel were not available at the original launch time. Most of the personnel are paid in the pay line and do not have their pay records with them. Insufficient personal clothing and other items were taken for a prolonged stay. Some wives are with insufficient funds. Retention is highly detrimental to morale and could have possible adverse effects on mission accomplishment.

#### Mission Reduction Plans In Making; Shuffle Starts

(TS ) The EurSecRgn agreed with this need and went a step further. It said if QUICK FOX was to continue, USAFSS should supply the personnel from U.S. resources.<sup>39</sup> This was of course impossible at the time, and despite the obvious consequences to the European program, and USAF, on 29 June 1962, decided to go ahead with the continued use of the 6916 RSM aircraft. They were making plans, however, to reduce the number of sorties being flown in Europe. But, at the same time, another possibility arose, and a five-month-long shuffle of aircraft started. In Greenville, Tex., at the TEMCO Aerosystems plant, a C-130B from the Pacific was being equipped with a new configuration called STRAW BRIDGE.\* This was to be finished about

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\* The STRAW BRIDGE configuration differed from the standard SUN VALLEY configuration in that it had four intercept positions. (See illustration next page.)

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# General Arrangement

STRAW BRIDGE

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1 August, and both and USAF felt that this aircraft, with the accompanying crew, should be diverted to Florida as soon as it was ready. Another aircraft, a C-130A from Europe, was to begin the same modification as soon as the first one was finished. The Washington agencies felt that this one could replace the PACAF when it was ready.\* So, the shuffle would continue while the went ahead with its efforts to establish a U.S. contingency capability. However, there was no progress in this direction as far as was known.<sup>40</sup>

(TS ) Under any circumstances, the PACAF aircraft wouldn't be ready immediately; and when it did come to MacDill AFB, there would have to be acceptance tests conducted by maintenance personnel. Also, on 2 July 1962, Major Harper told USAFSS that the back-end equipment on the 8916th RSM's C-130 was approaching mandatory bench check time. At the same time, he said he needed an extra maintenance man on board each mission because the operators were inexperienced. Experienced operators could conduct many maintenance details themselves, but with the current arrangement

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\* The back-end equipment configuration was the same in both C-130A and C-130B aircraft; the only difference was the range of the aircraft. The C-130B had two hours more flying time permission than the earlier model. This particular feature was the eventual deciding factor in the choice between the two aircraft,

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the extra man was needed to help keep the equipment running.<sup>41</sup>

USAF Says Help Might Be Coming. (S ) Quite obviously, which ever way the command turned, and whichever decision was reached by higher headquarters, there was trouble ahead. The capability of both overseas regions to continue operations was being strained in both equipment and personnel. During the first week in July, USAF advised USAFSS that additional aircraft (possibly two) would be made available to support the emergency operations in the U.S. The Pentagon did not know just when, but felt they should be ready by November. TEMCO, which was well acquainted with USAFSS engineering requirements, said that two aircraft could be modified in 90 days from the time they arrived in Greenville if off-the-shelf items were used as much as possible. The STRAW BRIDGE aircraft were to fill the gap until these became available.<sup>42</sup>

Manning Problem Looms Again. (S ) The command knew that this was the only solid solution, but it presented another problem; i.e., available qualified personnel. If USAF's presumption that the operation would eventually be permanent was accurate, then personnel would have to come from nation-wide resources. In the meantime, USAFSS would have to supply the necessary people; and this was not going to be easy. To man two C-130's, each with

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eight positions, would take 32 and two maintenance men. Six of the and 26 would be

This of course was still a problem because of the newness of the

requirement. USAFSS felt that until routine manning could be arranged, personnel would have to be selected from USAFSS units in the San Antonio-San Angelo, Tex., area. It said " . . . these personnel will be assigned additional duties as operators and maintenance technicians while assigned as overages to the selected USAFSS units (in this area).<sup>43</sup>

(S ) The operators would be selected from those Security Service with a capability, personnel (holding USAFSS operational AFSC's) and personnel without operational AFSC's.<sup>44</sup> On the surface this appeared to provide at least a partial solution, but personnel officials at Hq USAFSS were not nearly so optimistic about the eventual manning picture. They said:<sup>45</sup>

. . . No assurance can be given that an overage will exist to satisfy the requirement, especially since we are short and 301XX (personnel). Filling the requirement is problematical; while 26 of these people might be recruited by applying all three criteria . . . their acceptability to perform duties might be questionable. . . .

Manning Must Continue Under Any Circumstances. (C

These were, however, academic difficulties, for the fact remained

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that the command had to man QUICK FOX. As the operations people were working to set the mission up in an effective routine, the AFSCC was getting personnel ready to move into the Florida effort. By 18 July, the center had identified six people and made arrangements with Perrin AFB, Tex., to get them through physiological training instruction. They were due to return on 23 July. The 6940th TTW set up a 24-hour orientation-familiarization course for these same men.

to the wing and asked the Goodfellow AFB unit to make maximum use of locally assigned personnel in the instruction. At the same time, personnel officials were trying to look just a bit ahead so the command could waste as little time as possible in its selection of potential operators. They said:<sup>46</sup>

. . . It is felt by this office some form of standard test should be identified and used in determining the precise proficiency of those USAFSS individuals professing to have capability. The primary purpose of this test should be to evaluate the individual's capability as applies to USAFSS needs. This office will contact and other agencies in an effort to obtain a test of this nature. . . .

(C ~~2~~) Maintenance training was going to be a bit more difficult and time-consuming since no training facilities would be ready until the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1963. So, the selection of 301X1A personnel for QUICK FOX had to be limited to those

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with previous experience. Otherwise, on-the-job training would be required. Consequently, personnel officials felt that " . . . action (should) be initiated soonest to qualify additional operational personnel for this assignment -- alleviating a potential hardship in who would ultimately be assigned to this project."<sup>47</sup> Continuing with the items immediately at hand, the next day the command sent two of the six in training at Goodfellow AFB to Greenville, Tex., to participate in the flight tests of the STRAW BRIDGE aircraft there to " . . . provide these airmen with training on the systems installed in this aircraft. . . ."<sup>48</sup>

Personnel Requirements Set. (S ) At the same time, personnel and operations authorities were meeting at USAFSS to try to clear up the numerous details that were already in the air in connection with QUICK FOX. Personnel requirements, to be effective on 1 August and remain in effect until 31 October 1962, were: two six four 301XX, and one 64XXX for a total of 17. With the already in school, and four 301's coming from the Pacific,\* USAFSS still had to find six to fill the initial force. The AFSCC said there were a few more

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\* PacSecRgn had told the command that there was a number of personnel who had volunteered for assignment to QUICK FOX, but whether or not these were included in this number was not indicated.

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available there, but personnel authorities were highly concerned about what the situation was going to lead to after 1 November.<sup>49</sup>

EURSECRGN Down To Three Operational Aircraft

(TS ) Meanwhile, in Europe, the program -- because of the extended absence of its aircraft to the Cuban effort -- had gone from critical to downright drastic. The EurSecRgn, on 9 July 1962, said it simply didn't have the wherewithall to cope with its airborne requirements. It had lost at least 20 percent and its most critical days lay ahead. Only three aircraft remained for operations at the time, and its mission requirements were based on 12.

had not been forthcoming, but some changes had to be made -- and immediately. Which changes were to be made still lay in the hands of Washington agencies. Said EurSecRgn:<sup>50</sup>

. . . The effect of this marginal situation is that we must now make extensive . . . cutbacks in certain areas. Each cutback, and the area, will be largely determined by special requirements such as deployment to to take advantage of the

support, and SAC coordinated mission support. To illustrate, with five aircraft, of which one will always be in perfect maintenance, we are faced with the following situation. First, to deploy to for three missions requires seven days. If this aircraft is in we have one aircraft to cover the mission, support SAC missions, and perhaps more important, which is forecast to develop into a more sensitive area this Fall. And there still remains the problem of supporting

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type missions. It is not at all unlikely that a situation will develop wherein a decision will have to be made to forego support of one of the activities. Which shall it be? . . . Two aircraft, much less one, cannot cover all these activities. . . .

Negotiations were also under way with the \_\_\_\_\_ concerning new \_\_\_\_\_ and EurSecRgn knew that this authority might come at any time. If it came, the original estimate of 20 percent mission \_\_\_\_\_ would rise to 50 percent. Under any circumstance, the European operation was going to suffer, \_\_\_\_\_ in a number of categories which had been most useful up to that time.<sup>51</sup>

#### Pressure Increases At Washington Agencies

(TS: \_\_\_\_\_) Back in Washington, top level agencies apparently had troubles of their own. On 20 July, the Secretary of Defense told \_\_\_\_\_ felt that the diversion of the \_\_\_\_\_ was pretty well in hand, but the immediate supply of qualified \_\_\_\_\_ in the third echelon plant was going to be a different story. The Army and Navy had been able to supply a few, but USAFSS, with all of the high priority tasking it had already received, was not able to do so at the time. The temporary duty tour \_\_\_\_\_ was to be six months, and clearance status was clearly going to be the principal difficulty.

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Finally, asked the Air Force Chief of Staff for 40 who were otherwise qualified but didn't hold clearances.<sup>52</sup> USAF subsequently supplied 19 in its first shipment, and said that the remaining 21 would be by the end of August. No clearances were being run, however, until it was decided whether or not these people could do the job.<sup>53</sup>

Validity of Requirements Still Not Established. (TS )

The picture as far as Cuba was concerned was still not clear. The validity of NSA's requirements had not been accurately determined. USAFSS's Major Luther A. Tarbox, who went late in July to work with analysts, reported that it was quite impossible to determine the validity since they were still in the development stage.

With a single aircraft this had been virtually impossible, though there had been unique almost from the inception of the program. Maj. Tarbox said " . . . they are not sure of their program except that much more must be before there is room for correlation of This of course will be time consuming. . . .".<sup>54</sup>

(TS ) There was progress during the meeting, though, because for the first time the analysts and all those connected with the

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project put their heads together in the form of a routine scheduling conference to determine just when and where the                      should fly.

Maj. Tarbox added:<sup>55</sup>

. . . this was a first and rather unique activity. It might be said that the majority of                      tasking that has startled USAFSS and PACAF could have been coordinated in the same manner. It is therefore advisable for (a USAFSS) representative to meet with the                      personnel to attempt to coordinate the national requirements on a monthly basis.

Tasking Finally Comes. (TS                      )

Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the national agency finally agreed that " . . . in view (of)                     

. . .", USAFSS should assume timely                     

at the MacDill

AFB site.<sup>56</sup> This was what the command had always wanted, but the lack of previous authority had prohibited manning the site for such an eventuality. So, when the word did come from the command realized that personnel for the job would be in critical demand. Major Harper looked closely at the situation at MacDill AFB, however, and said that by careful manning and planning he could take on the job immediately. He was told to plan to start operation on 1 August, and USAFSS immediately shipped three units from Kelly AFB. It planned to have four new

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personnel on site by 20 August. In the meantime,

were taken from three airborne positions -- positions that were not immediately required in the Cuban operations.<sup>57</sup> Operations officials at USAFSS said that " . . . due to short lead time, personnel possessing the appropriate national background may be used without regard to AFSC."<sup>58</sup>

USAF Sets 30 September Deadline For      Aircraft

(S      ) From a purely flying standpoint, however, QUICK FOX was becoming more and more an unsure entity at the Pentagon. There was no doubt that it had to continue somehow, but there was definite question as to where the aircraft would come from. On 26 July USAF told

. . . This headquarters is unable to continue Cuban operation on an indefinite basis. Lacking a firm requirement for capability over and above the currently authorized aircraft assigned to USAFE and PACAF and an indication of a cutoff date for the Cuban operation, this headquarters proposes to stop Cuban coverage on 30 September 1962. This action is proposed in order to relieve the strain on currently assigned resources and on the assumption that sufficient technical

data will have been obtained to satisfy your requirements. If future operations are anticipated in the Western Hemisphere, a statement of the requirement is requested in order that appropriate action may be initiated to provide a capability without undue strain on assigned resources.

Agrees, But . . . . (S      ) Within the week,

advised USAF that it had issued instructions to EurSecRgn for priorities of European orbits in an effort to ease the strain. It

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also had planning actions under way for long-term, world-wide

requirements to provide a cushion for contingency requirements such as Cuba. In short, it agreed that the " . . . Cuban effort (was) causing strain on currently assigned resources in view of limitations (in the inventory) . . .". The clincher, however, was as follows:<sup>60</sup>

. . . cannot at this time justify single for long term requirements

Nevertheless, had been directed by Deputy Secretary of Defense to continue indefinite . . .

In this regard, this agency presently examining several alternatives designed to meet Secretary of Defense requirement for period beyond 30 September 1962. One such alternative is, of course, continuation of . . . upon determination most effective/economical alternative, appropriate recommendation will be made (to) Joint Chiefs of Staff (by) Secretary of Defense instructions.

USAF Apparently Holding TALL TOM In Reserve. (TS )

Meanwhile, there was evidence that the ULD-1 equipped TALL TOM aircraft was still being considered by the Pentagon. Major Tarbox, on his swing through USAF, and the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), found that there were some differing bits of information from one place to another. AFLC appeared to feel that USAF was considering adapting the prototype to Cuban operations. This was not impossible, but TALL TOM was not designed to operate under the QUICK FOX concepts in such a low

Major Tarbox felt that it should not

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be confined to such a small operational area for an indefinite period of time. He said:<sup>61</sup>

. . . The use of TALL TOM as an emergency reaction capability is not in the best interests of the \_\_\_\_\_ program. TALL TOM is not, in its total \_\_\_\_\_ the answer to flexibility and mobility requirements so important to a successful emergency reaction capability. The operational costs of TALL TOM (and support) far exceed that of a simple SUN VALLEY \_\_\_\_\_ configuration. TALL TOM operator skill does not exist for the Cuban effort and must be returned from Europe, and \_\_\_\_\_ linguists cross trained into the program. (TALL TOM \_\_\_\_\_ . . . .

Qualified Personnel Again Arises As Problem. (S \_\_\_\_\_ ) Avail-

able personnel again arose as a hitch to the plans. There were 19 unit manning document (UMD) spaces associated with the system. These could be transferred from the 6916th RSM when the TALL TOM aircraft was returned to the U.S. On the other hand, however, the normal non-operational maintenance and support functions, which were in place in the European squadron, were not available at the Florida base and would have to be provided. Officials also pointed out the extra need for materiel and electronics personnel, but the biggest item was qualified operators for the ULD-1 system. At Hq USAFSS, the feeling was that:<sup>62</sup>

. . . The ULD-1 trained operations and maintenance personnel have been overseas less than one year and are not eligible for return from overseas PCS.\* This is especially true in the case

\* Permanent Change of Station. [Note: This not only would require high-level waiver of regulations if the personnel were returned permanently, but the 6916th RSM would be deprived of some manpower that it was to gain when the tests were finished.]

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of married personnel. The only alternative is to return personnel from the 6916th RSM (on temporary duty status) to the Z.I. for the maximum length of time in support of QUICK FOX. (Communications-electronics) representatives proposed return of all ULD-1 maintenance personnel to MacDill AFB for 120 days TDY and immediate action to initiate special factory training for replacement. . . personnel.

USAF Wants TALL TOM In Place By 1 November. (S )

The Pentagon wanted the ULD-1 in place at MacDill AFB and ready to operate by 1 November 1962. So, on 30 July, operations, communications-electronics, and personnel officials met at Hq USAFSS to decide what would be involved if this change was made. First consideration was the location of the TALL TOM aircraft in support of QUICK FOX. All indications pointed toward continuing the operations at MacDill AFB because of the support available there. In MacDill's favor was: (a) Tactical Air Command (TAC) already had a maintenance team at the Tampa base to maintain the aircraft, and (b) secure communications were available at the AFSSO STRICOM. The only drawback to the station was the shortage of secure space for the new operation. Sixteen hundred square feet were needed for the and maintenance operations in connection with the system.<sup>63</sup> The operational target date set an emergency requirement before the command, however, so personnel officials recommended that:<sup>64</sup>

. . . three ULD-1 trained  
TDY to MacDill and ten

be returned  
USAFSS personnel,

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preferably with background, be selected for PCS assignment to ULD-1 QUICK FOX operation. These personnel should undergo a minimum of twelve weeks operational training at Goodfellow AFB. Unless the program is formalized and tasking issued from (operations) to (personnel) in a very short time, it will be impossible to meet the 1 November target date with ten well-trained personnel.

### Project QUICK FOX Successful From Operational Standpoint

(TS ) Here, again, all of these discussions and plans were of an academic nature so far as the operations of QUICK FOX were concerned. And, despite all of these difficulties with personnel and aircraft, QUICK FOX operations were -- and had been almost from the beginning -- successful. There had been no significant equipment outages and all other support had been acceptable. Early in September 1962, SSgt Jose Ojeda, who had been involved from the start, reported:<sup>65</sup>

. . . Operation QUICK FOX is an operational success. The  
The  
contention is based on which I accomplished and  
(which were) subsequently substantiated by evaluations.  
Messages suggested it was particularly interested

The quality and quantity of QUICK FOX  
missions have been very satisfactory and operational personnel  
had no difficulty in  
In my opinion the use of who can make on-  
the-spot evaluations  
has resulted in a greater yield of

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Top Guidance Still Lacking. (S ) Despite this opinion, guidance from top-level agencies was still going to have to improve before QUICK FOX could be regarded as a complete operation. Captain Alan E. James, on 2 August 1962, reported the following:<sup>66</sup>

STRAW BRIDGE Starts; USAF Calls For USAF Permanently

(TS ) On 4 August, the PACAF STRAW BRIDGE started flying, and the USAF was returned to Europe. But USAF felt that this was too advanced a system to be used in Cuba. So, amid the apparent pressure at the Pentagon, USAF, in a message on 7 August 1962, said:<sup>67</sup>

. . . Official request to continue of Cuba in response to Department of Defense directive is expected soon from One possible course of action . . . is reallocation of one USAF to a continental United States operating command for an indefinite period. Understand that has requested deletion or decrease of certain European to permit present QUICK FOX operation although details not known here . . . .

The Pentagon asked USAFSS just how much impact on the European program would result from the withdrawal of one aircraft, adding

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that TALL TOM was still being considered for the Cuba requirement.

The Pentagon emphasized that the recall of the USAF was  
not related to the command's recommendation for U.S. based

contingency capabilities; and that was expected to endorse  
the concept. This was of little value at the time, however, as  
considerable lead time would be required to put the aircraft into  
operation if the approval was eventually forthcoming.<sup>68</sup>

STRAW BRIDGE Gets Preference; TALL TOM Dropped Again.

(TS ) Concerning the withdrawal of one of its aircraft,

EurSecRgn said:<sup>69</sup>

. . . We are fully aware of the fact that a national requirement  
dictates use of But  
we would be remiss in our obligations if we did not again  
emphasize the fact that we cannot expand our effort into  
on a continuing basis. . . . The diversion  
of the C-130 to MacDill did significantly curtail our capability  
the past two months. . . .

On 10 August, USAF dropped another bombshell, however, when  
it said that the EurSecRgn STRAW BRIDGE aircraft, which began  
modification as soon as the PACAF aircraft left TEMCO, would be  
diverted for a period following its completion. At the same time,  
the Pentagon again reversed its decision to use TALL TOM on the  
Cuban problem. Although the command felt that it would be to  
everyone's advantage to give the STRAW BRIDGE aircraft a good  
shakedown before it was released to USAF, the European Security

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Region became really concerned about the development. The cold hard fact in Europe was that the airborne effort was going to suffer about 50 percent loss if the STRAW BRIDGE aircraft was retained in Florida for any length of time after the modification was finished. So, on the basis of EurSecRgn's objections, the command told USAF:<sup>70</sup>

. . . It is impossible to determine before hand the actual as it is contingent upon many uncontrollable factors. However, we can say with some certainty that the following categories

Command Turns To PACAF For Aircraft. (TS: ) Retention of the USAF aircraft would again reduce the European fleet to four, and with this number the region could not begin to meet its commitments. With this in mind, the command recommended that the PACAF STRAW BRIDGE aircraft be retained at MacDill AFB indefinitely, or until replaced by one of the following:<sup>71</sup>

1. An additional aircraft for modification and assignment to project QUICK FOX.

2. If an additional airframe was not immediately available, one of PACAF's trainers should be retrofitted -- or a standard PACAF be deployed for the effort.

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(TS ) Under any circumstances, the command was certain that the ultimate answer had to be extra aircraft for the U.S. operations. The was preferable to the as it had two hours extra range -- and this was needed in Cuban operations to adequately

In this respect, the need worked out somewhat with the supply, because PACAF -- though it would certainly be hurt operationally by the withdrawal of any of its aircraft -- had to be considered in somewhat better condition than USAFE.<sup>72</sup>

Boosts Take; Processing Crew Pressed

(C ) In the meantime, the MacDill Security detachment had started first echelon and immediate

<sup>73</sup> But the effort was taxing the small crew, and the command knew that it would be at least a couple of weeks before it could deliver any help. By the middle of August, the encouraging success of the PACAF STRAW BRIDGE aircraft, with its ~~increased~~ range and capability, put a greater load on the small crew at the Tampa site. On 14 August, Major Harper reported that the " . . . arrival of for QUICK FOX missions has resulted in more

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So, to take up some of the slack, four of the six who had been in training at Goodfellow AFB, were ordered to report to the site early. They were to arrive in Florida by 17 August because of revised operational requirements.<sup>75</sup>

USAF Proposes Reconfiguring PACAF Trainer. (TS)

In Washington, USAF proposed configuring one of PACAF's training to the standard SUN VALLEY II installation of ten positions. The Pentagon also anticipated that the STRAW BRIDGE II which was already flying out of Tampa, would continue to be used until the new aircraft was ready for permanent assignment.<sup>76</sup> The command agreed that this should be done in preference to its original suggestion for fewer positions because it would be cheaper in the long run. There would be comparatively little added expense for ten positions, and it was looking forward to the day when the Cuban effort was no longer necessary. At that time, the aircraft could be used for normal Pacific duty. Said the command:<sup>77</sup>

. . . Cost of installing 10 positions versus five positions is very little. (sic) Engineering for 10 positions has already been accomplished and paid for by Air Force, and any new engineering would run the cost higher than going to a standard configuration. The high cost items are the wiring and the soundproof compartment. Installing only five positions will require the same amount of wiring, and the same size compartment as would 10 positions. Complete training is available for both operators and maintenance technicians on the SUN VALLEY II system.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Effort Continues To Grow; Provisional Detachment Formed

(TS ) As the operation at MacDill AFB continued to grow (and showed no signs of diminishing) the matter of secure working space at the Tampa air base became of some concern to

visited the installation later in August, Major Harper assured him that space would be available for operations, although there was a possible difficulty in the mill concerning rehabilitation of the buildings to conform to specifications.\* During the visit, however, the project officer put some significance into a statement by the and later reported to the command that:<sup>78</sup>

. . . He mentioned the proximity of MacDill to the effort at Key West and Naval stations afloat and also stated that facility was very crowded. From (this) it might be assumed that is considering the use of MacDill

(S ) This was something that was in the future, however, if anything ever developed. The command had more pressing problems.

- 
- \* General Box, J-3 of STRICOM, said that Secretary of Defense had advised that no money would be expended on MacDill since it was a soft core base and its longevity was uncertain. STRICOM understood that the TAC tenure called for the period through FY-64. primary concern relative to the AFSSO and QUICK FOX program was availability of space on MacDill. He was assured that AFSSO space requirements would be made available; however, rehabilitation could be a problem. Major Harper had informally coordinated with the base commander and (Cont'd on page 53)

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The operation was getting bigger and looking more permanent all the time, so the command felt that steps would have to be taken to more solidly organize the loose-fitting group it had been up to that point. After two weeks of study, operations officials at Hq USAFSS proposed organization of a provisional detachment, under control of the 6945th RSM, Goodfellow AFB, Tex. The unit would be manned with one officer and an appropriate number of airmen on TDY status until the unit could be made permanent.<sup>79</sup> On 23 August this became effective. The unit was designated "Provisional Security Detachment 1, 6945th RSM, MacDill AFB, Fla." All personnel were assigned to the 6945th RSM, and all future personnel and equipment would be provided from resources under the control of the squadron commander.<sup>80</sup>

**AFLC Wrecks Retrofit Plans; TALL TOM Comes Back Into Picture**

(Secret) Halfway across the country the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) "shot down" the USAF proposal to retrofit a PACAF aircraft -- at least for the immediate future. Specifically AFLC said that "... current workload and group 'B' component

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\* (Cont'd from page 52)  
made him aware of possible tasking.

+ In October, the Navy Key West effort was augmented with USAFSS personnel, and in November USAFSS moved its Emergency Reaction Unit (ERU) to Cudjoe Key, Fla. These developments will be discussed in detail in Volume II of this study.

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availability is such that entry of the aircraft into the modification program is not feasible prior to 15 October. This would result in delivery early in January 1963." The Wright-Patterson AFB headquarters added that in view of the objections to its recommended modifications to the TALL TOM aircraft for QUICK FOX, the ULD-1 aircraft should be used without modification to fulfill the project requirements when it was returned from Europe. USAFSS knew that this could be done only by increased accommodations for the ground support equipment and acceptance of the accompanying expenses involved.<sup>81</sup>

(Secret) But TALL TOM was back, and the command really had little choice in accepting or rejecting its use. A new aircraft cost too much and took too long; and USAFSS felt that further withdrawal of aircraft from either Europe or the Pacific was out of the question if there was any other possibility at all. Consequently, though it still preferred the SUN VALLEY II aircraft over the ULD-1, it began to re-examine its potential use. The outlook was not as bad as it could have been, though there were many problems remaining.<sup>82</sup>

Support Space A Prime Consideration. (Secret) Before going into the operational considerations, the command asked TAC if it could provide air conditioned space for the support equipment. The fighter command said it could if USAF ordered the move. The

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command advised the Pentagon of this and continued its probe of the ULD-1's use. There were no procedural difficulties that could not be overcome, although the system was being used far below its intended capability. There were, however, some personnel difficulties that would have to be straightened out before the unit could become operational. The ULD-1 personnel, who had been in Europe for some 18 months, would have to return early from their overseas tour when the system was returned to the U.S. The group included 14 operators, maintenance men, and support personnel; and the command needed two more maintenance, two supply, and three contract technicians to operate project QUICK FOX. The unit manning document spaces, which had been established for TALL TOM, were to be deleted on 31 August when the tests were complete. These, however, would have to be transferred to the detachment. Everything considered, the command went along with the plan to use TALL TOM, and told USAF:<sup>83</sup>

. . . Although the operating cost of the ULD-1 is higher than a standard        if funds are not available to reconfigure a C-130B trainer into a standard        utilizing the ULD-1 for QUICK FOX project would be preferable to the present or contemplated deployment of the STRAW BRIDGE or SUN VALLEY B aircraft to MacDill which seriously reduces mission capability overseas. . . .

Loss Of STRAW BRIDGE II Causes Pinch In Pacific

(Secret) While these shufflings were taking place, the PACAF

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continued to supply the platform for the airborne operations. Through August and into September it flew both day and night missions as specified by but as long as it stayed on the Cuban problem, it was lost to the Commander, PacSecRgn. The problem was recognized at the Pentagon, particularly the loss of the advanced configuration of the aircraft, so on 10 September, USAF told PACAF:<sup>84</sup>

. . . To permit an early return of the STRAW BRIDGE aircraft to your area, consideration is being given to utilizing one of your trainer aircraft, retrofitted to a standard configuration for the QUICK FOX requirement . . . .

So PACAF was in the same position formerly held by USAFE -- regardless of which way it turned it was going to lose an airplane. Primary basis for the shift (other than the fact that the Pacific operation was in slightly better shape than the European operation) was the extra two hours orbit time of the . The PacSecRgn countered this by recommending that extra time could be gained by staging from the Guantanamo Naval Air Station in Cuba rather than from Florida. However, this apparently was too precarious a position to put the aircraft into because nothing more was heard about it. In defense of its own needs, PacSecRgn said at the same time that " . . . success with in the Pacific should not only preclude drawing of its resources, but should prove justification

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for additional aircraft. "85

\_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Mission Requirements

(S ) However, there was going to be no immediate relief  
to any phase of -- or any other part of for  
that matter. On 2 September, had added 1

86 Some of this type of had cropped up  
from time to time in weeks past and showed that

as the weeks and months  
passed was to bring up another obstacle which will be discussed  
later in this study.)

First Echelon Has Troubles. (S ) Of more  
immediate concern, however, was the difficulties being encountered  
by the MacDill detachment in the

instructions specified that the material should be  
, but this was causing trouble.  
On 6 September, the detachment asked the national agency if it  
could waive this requirement and

~~SECRET~~ The need for this was caused by the fact that the

while the experienced did not

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This led to a double requirement when the analyst had to have

The detachment felt that ". . .

later agreed to this change.

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Picture Begins to Develop

(Secret NOFORN) Throughout all of this maze of problems and development, the picture began to form in Washington. Late in September, the Air Force Chief of Staff issued an estimate of air-associated military activities in Cuba. The listing was as follows:<sup>88</sup>

1. Eleven surface to air missile sites being constructed.

Some were practically operational, or would be in a few weeks.

2. One SAM assembly area.

3. Two possible cruise missile sites, type unknown.

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\* This shortcoming actually went back to the command's initial difficulty in supplying personnel to the project. Many were selected almost entirely on their ability to and were sent to duty after the briefest and most compressed analysis courses. Consequently, they did not have the background required to develop an entirely new entity. By the same token, the experienced analysts were principally from operations that had a requirement and these had to have the accomplished for them before they were able to supply analysis of the material.

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4. Total MIG 15/17/19 inventory estimated at 60 aircraft at three bases. None were believed to be operational at the time and were not up to full strength.

5. MIG-21's had appeared at one base - estimated at squadron strength (12).

(TS )

The Cuban Crisis Develops

(S ) Through September and into October, activity in Cuba reached fever pitch as Soviet Russia pressed installation of ballistic

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sites along with the "defensive" armaments already in evidence. More and more indisputable evidence poured in from Cuba through many sources-- confirming the buildup of military might. From early September the island had been under intense scrutiny via photographic eyes; it was filmed from end to end in an effort to either confirm or refute the evidence. On 14 October, it finally came. A U-2 photo reconnaissance aircraft, flying high above San Cristobal, brought back the proof on film of offensive weapons. Then, a month-long international tug-of-war started.<sup>91</sup>

Success Acknowledged (S ) In Florida, the \_\_\_\_\_ was flying as often as possible, though it admittedly was not often enough to fully \_\_\_\_\_ the problem. The detachment was still not entirely certain as to the success of its operations because the \_\_\_\_\_

However, indications filtered down from time to time and on \_\_\_\_\_

In a wire to the command on that day, \_\_\_\_\_

... \_\_\_\_\_ Job well done."<sup>92</sup>

SAC/ ~~TOP SECRET~~ Coordination Ordered; JCS Orders Daily Flights.

(S ) As the day approached for the President's proclamation, \_\_\_\_\_ ordered simultaneous operations of \_\_\_\_\_ and QUICK FOX \_\_\_\_\_ missions whenever possible considering \_\_\_\_\_

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the equipmental limitations in being.<sup>93</sup> With only one aircraft flying, and no reserve, this couldn't be done with anything approaching maximum utilization. Regardless of this, however, the pressure and tension increased following installation of the Naval blockade. So, on 19 October,

No Navy Aircraft; Europe Gets Call Again. (TS ) The Chief of Naval Operations immediately informed the JCS that the Navy had no WV-2Q aircraft available for the operation,<sup>95</sup> so the assignment again fell to the Air Force and USAFSS. The order was immediately transmitted to USAFE for a to be put on Cuban operations for a week, beginning on 25 October. In addition, USAF told all commands that:<sup>95</sup>

. . . This headquarters has been directed to equip QUICK FOX detachment with two aircraft. In order to do this TAC will complete 300-hour inspection on STRAW BRIDGE aircraft on a double shift, expedited basis. SAC will deliver aircraft to Sewart AFB on 23 October for inspection to commence on 24 October. . . (USAFE) will provide for seven days with front end crew and crew chief for seven days TDY to QUICK FOX detachment at MacDill AFB. . . (USAFSS) Request additional qualified personnel as necessary, be sent to MacDill AFB to temporarily man USAFE and to process additional take. In addition, personnel should be retained at MacDill to continue operation of STRAW BRIDGE aircraft after inspection, until other arrangements for additional can be made. In this regard, understand

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proposal for use of TALL TOM can be expected. Personnel should arrive MacDill not later than 23 October. . . . All actions requested above are in support of highest national priority. \_

The 6916th RSM again prepared to operate with one less aircraft, and the            departed Rhein Main on 21 October. It arrived in Florida the next day and prepared to start operations when necessary.<sup>97</sup>

#### Military Deployment Saturates South Florida

(TS            ) Meanwhile, the steady deployment of personnel and equipment from all services threatened to saturate the military and Naval installations in south Florida and the keys. Day and night they rolled into the few installations available as the President prepared for a possible invasion of Cuba if the Soviet Union didn't accept his ultimatum to remove all offensive weapons from the Caribbean island. Public and secret meetings in Washington, the United Nations, and other points continued in the pressing negotiations to begin a settlement of the crisis. Fidel Castro steadfastly refused to allow neutral inspection of military sites, so all that remained was the cameras of photoreconnaissance aircraft to keep track of the developments.

Air Traffic Gets Thick. (TS            ) Operations grew to fever pitch as the blockade of Soviet shipping tightened. Simultaneously,

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U. S. operations increased steadily as B-47's, F-101's, U-2's, and Navy aircraft flooded the air over and around the island. Traffic increased to the point that it actually became a flying safety concern to the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD). The Air Defense commander said:<sup>98</sup>

. . . Navy Key West has visual contact knowledge of QUICK FOX flights flying through warning areas . . . without proper coordination and approval. Navy Key West considers these warning areas "hot" at all times, with both surface to air and air to air firing. An additional Navy concern is the possibility of mid-air collisions, and therefore requires flight clearance prior to entering these areas. . . . Request CINCSAC provide any information that CINCLANT might require in order that CINCLANT may effect the clearances and coordination necessary for QUICK FOX flights through the warning areas. . . . Request CINCLANT reflect all including COMTAC and CINCSAC photo, flights, in CINCLANT area in CINCLANT monthly reconnaissance schedule. . . .

Commander Asks for Advance Flight Routes. (TS )

The growing flight activity also concerned the detachment commander at MacDill AFB. There were so many aircraft flying in the area it was becoming impossible to be sure which were friendly and which were hostile during missions. The aircraft had to know who was flying in the area if its was to work as it should. On 18 October, Major Harper said:<sup>99</sup>

. . . Request this unit be provided with specific . . . flight routes, times, and dates of all common cause missions. QUICK FOX flight flown today . . .



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(S ) From the standpoint of stability, the program took another step forward on 15 October when the "provisional" status was dropped from the detachment and it was made a permanent part of the 6945th RSM, Goodfellow AFB. Further, the detachment was to be augmented by 15 additional personnel in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1963. 101

Soviet Activity Increases. (TS ) Even during the early phases, there was solid evidence that the Soviets were taking over the operating elements of Cuban military activity.

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(TS ) More significant from a purely tactical military point of view was the confirmation of the earlier report of MIG-21's in the CRAF inventory.

(TS ) Thus, the STRAW BRIDGE was going to have to be retained on QUICK FOX, and this put the Pacific Security Region in the same position held by the European Security Region earlier in the project. The next day, said it " . . .

So, again, the squeeze was on. Two weeks earlier, a C-130B of the

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SUN VALLEY II (the standard in use) had been sent from TEMCO to Florida to relieve the STRAW BRIDGE aircraft for return to the Pacific. With the intensified operations out of Florida, the SUN VALLEY II was also slated for Cuban operations. So, rather than getting its advanced model in return for a standard aircraft, PacSecRgn was two aircraft short for its extended operations covering from The European had come and gone, so it was up to the two to perform the mission. The retention of these two aircraft in Florida was to have a damaging effect on the Pacific program, so later in the month, the command sent an urgent request to USAF for relief of the pressure in the form of additional aircraft for the mission. Early in December, USAF indicated that this would eventually come, but from the point of immediate utility, there was no relief in sight. (A point to remember here was the JCS requirement for daily flights synchronized with -- a task that simply couldn't be handled with only two aircraft. This development reflected all the way back to the command's initial requirement for three aircraft to conduct a complete program

TALL TOM Slated for 15 November. (TS Meanwhile, early in November, AFLC said that the TALL TOM C-130 would be ready for pickup at the TEMCO plant about the middle of the month.

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This scheduling was accurate, and the aircraft was at MacDill AFB by the fifteenth of the month. Presumably, the ULD-1 equipment was all ready to fly, but there was the problem of getting the ground support equipment back from Europe before it could be utilized as a complete system. This material was returned by the end of November, but some front-end maintenance difficulties kept the aircraft out of the air as of 15 December 1962. There were also the ULD-1 personnel considerations discussed previously. These were still under consideration at the beginning of December 1962.

Yield of QUICK FOXSomewhat Phenominal

(TS) From a purely

standpoint, the

portion

of the Cuban operations showed a fantastic return. Using one aircraft for the most part, with less than 30 men assigned, the project take was responsible for more than half of the

More than 80 missions

were flown by 1 December. Two important facts stood out in this resume, however. First was the fact that many of the operators and had been rushed onto the job -- many with precious little background other than an ability to

Second was the job done by many personnel who could not to begin with and had to depend on

. Added to this was the constant shuffling of personnel as the aircraft went back and forth between Europe, the Pacific, and the U.S.

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NOTES

1. Draft, USAFSS OPLAN 14-62, undated.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Msg, AFOOP-SA 27-4-559, USAF to DIA, 27 Apr 62. (Note:  
For several years, particularly in the Pacific area,  
had been more and more relied upon for the  
As a matter of fact, in the  
Pacific, it was practically the lone remaining
5. Ibid.
6. Ltr, USAFSS to AFSCC, Req for W/MFR  
thereto, 30 Apr 62.
7. Memo, SCW-2A to SCW-2, Trip Report (SSgt Jose Ojeda),  
17 May 62.
8. Msg, ADN/127/62, to JCS, 1 Jun 62.
9. Msg, ODC 5-6-23, USAFSS to USAF, 5 Jun 62.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Msg, JCS 1360-62, JCS to USAF, undated.
13. Msg, AFOOP 6-6-97, USAF to 6 Jun 62.
14. Msg, ODC 12-6-71, USAFSS to USAF, 11 Jun 62.
15. Ibid.
16. Interview with TSgt H.R.R. Caron, OOA, 9 Nov 62.
17. Msg, ODC 15-6-100, USAFSS to 15 Jun 62.
18. Msg, ADN/137/62, to USAFSS, 18 Jun 62.

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19. Ibid.
20. Msg, ADN/138/62, to JCS, 18 Jun 62.
21. Msg, OPO 20-6-517, EurSecRgn to USAFSS, 20 Jun 62.
22. Msg, SSO USAFE 20-6-222, USAFE to USAF, 20 Jun 62.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Msg, ODC 21-6-143, USAFSS to USAF, 21 Jun 62.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Msg, CDC 22-6-54, Klocko to Taylor, 21 Jun 62.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Msg, RDC 25-6-4, Taylor to Klocko, 25 Jun 62.
32. Memo (draft), to Col. Macia, USAFSS DCS/Opns, Pos  
Regarding Cuban Ops, undated.
33. Ibid.
34. Msg, ODC 28-6-199, USAFSS to AFSSO STRICOM, W/MFR  
thereto, 28 Jun 62.
35. Ltr, PPD to PDC, Proj QUICK FOX 27 Jun 62.
36. Ibid.
37. Msg, STRI-2-SO 28-6-103, AFSSO STRIKE to USAFSS, 28 Jun 62.
38. Msg, OPN 28-6-765, EurSecRgn to USAFSS, 28 Jun 62.
39. Ibid.
40. Msg, POI/848, to USAF, 29 Jun 62.

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41. Memo, OOD to all staffs, (c) CONUS Emergency Reaction Units, 6 Jul 62.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. 1st Ind (to OOD Memo (C) CONUS Emergency Reaction Units, 6 Jul 62), 17 Jul 62.
46. Memo, PTD to PPD, (C) CONUS Emergency Reaction Unit, 18 Jul 62.
47. Ibid.
48. Memo, OOR/OOD to PAD, Proj QUICK FOX, 19 Jul 62.
49. Memo For Record (Mr. O.C. Turner), 19 Jul 62.
50. Msg, OOR 9-7-249, EurSecRgn to USAFSS, 9 Jul 62.
51. Ibid.
52. Msg DIR 165/62, to USAF, 20 Jul 62.
53. Msg, AFCIN-1C 14-8-351, USAF to 14 Aug 62.
54. Memo, OOD/OOR to ODC, Trip Report (Maj. L.A. Tarbox), 30 Jul 62, hereinafter referred to as "Tarbox Report."
55. Ibid.
56. Msg, DIR 165/62, to USAF, 20 Jul 62.
57. ~~Msg~~, ODC 24-7-132, USAFSS to USAF, W/MFR thereto, 23 Jul 62.
58. Memo, OOD/OOR to PPD, QUICK FOX, 24 Jul 62. (Note: The inexperience of the assigned in the initial group became a factor after a couple of weeks of operation. On 7 September, operations personnel said that project QUICK FOX was experiencing difficulties in the phase of the operation. Operators and were chosen from numerous career fields on the basis of the capability. Many had little or no experience in production. The personnel with the background,

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who had the 202X0 AFSC, were recent school graduates and lacked the depth of experience to develop,

They asked for two airmen, fully qualified in

to be assigned to the security detachment at MacDill. The AFSCC supplied these men on 28 Sept 62. (Memo, OOD/OOR to PDC, QUICK FOX, 7 Sept 62).

59. Msg, AFOOP-SA 26-7-604, USAF to 26 Jul 62.
60. Msg, POI/1014-62, DIRNSA to USAF, 1 Aug 62.
61. Tarbox Report.
62. Memo For Record, AN/ULD-1 Deployment to Proj QUICK FOX, (TSgt Merle R. Walcher), 30 Jul 62.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Memo, SCW-2A to SCW, SCA, SCC, Rpt of TDY to AFSSO STRICOM (SSgt Jose Ojeda) 10 Sept 62.
66. Memo, SCO-1 to SCC/SCD, Report of TDY to AFSSO STRICOM (Capt. A.E. James, Jr.), 2 Aug 62.
67. Msg, AFCIN-1C 7-8-165, USAF to USAFSS, 7 Aug 62.
68. Ibid.
69. Msg, OOR 1-8-39, EurSecRgn to USAFSS, 1 Aug 62.
70. Msg, ODC (no cite no.), USAFSS to USAF, W/MFR thereto, 10 Aug 62.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Msg, ODC (no cite no.) USAFSS to W/MFR thereto, 7 Aug 62.
74. Msg, STRJ2-SO, 14-8-84, AFSSO STRIKE to USAFSS, 14 Aug 62.
75. Memo, OOD/OOR to PPD, QUICK FOX, 14 Aug 62.

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98. Msg, ITE JCS 2493-62, JCS to CINCLANT, 2 Oct 62.
99. Msg, STRJ-2-SO 18-10-149, AFSSO STRIKE to USAFSS, 18 Oct 62.
100. Msg, B11/371, to Det 1, 28 Sept 62.
101. Memo, OMD/OMM to all staff sections, QUICK FOX Manpower Auth, 19 Oct 62; authority for activation, USAFSS S.O. GB-16, 11 Oct 62.
102. Msg, STRJ-2-SO 16-10-110; Det 1 to 16 Oct 62.
103. Msg, STRJ-2-SO 19-10-151, Det 1 to 19 Oct 62.
104. Ibid.
105. Msg, C111/5451, to USAFSS, 2 Nov 62.

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76. 1st Ind, OOD/OOR to PPD (to Memo, Proj QUICK FOX, 8 Aug 62), 16 Aug 62.
77. Msg, ODC 17-8-85, USAFSS to USAF, W/MFR thereto, 16 Aug 62.
78. Msg, STRJ2-SO 22-8-104, AFSSO STRIKE to USAFSS, 22 Aug 62.
79. Memo, OOR/OOD to ODC, Proj QUICK FOX, 14 Aug 62.
80. USAFSS S.O., No. GB-11, 23 Aug 62.
81. Msg, MCMX 2018, AFLC to USAF, 24 Aug 62.
82. Msg, ODC 30-8-172, USAFSS to USAF, W/MFR thereto, 29 Aug 62.
83. Ibid.
84. Msg, AFOOP-SA 81261, USAF to PACAF, 10 Sept 62.
85. Msg, OPR 5-10-74, PacSecRgn to USAFSS, 6 Oct 62.
86. Msg, C111/4230, Det 1, 2 Sept 62.
87. Msg, STRJ-2 SO, 6-9-31, AFSSO STRIKE to USAFSS, 6 Sept 62.
88. Msg, AFCIN-3R2 1662/62, CSAF to ALMAJCOM, 26 Sept 62.
89. Msg, STRJ2-SO 15-9-69, Det 1 to 19 Sept 62.
90. Msg, B1/69, USAFSS, 24 Sept 62.
91. The New York Times Service, "The Days, The Hours of Crisis," 3 Nov 62.
92. Msg, ADP/157, USAFSS, 10 Oct 62.
93. ~~Msg~~, C111/4923, USAFSS, 12 Oct 62.
94. ~~Msg~~, ADP 167, JCS, 19 Oct 62.
95. Msg, JCS 2898-62, JCS to 20 Oct 62.
96. Msg, AFOOP 19-10-566, USAF to USAFSS, 19 Oct 62.
97. Msg, OOR/SDO 20-10-83, EurSecRgn to USAFSS, 21 Oct 62.

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